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Abstract. The problem of interpreting quantum theory on a large (e.g. cosmological)
scale has been commonly conceived as a search for objective reality in a framework that is
fundamentally probabilistic. The Everett programme attempts to evade the issue by the
reintroduction of determinism at the global level of a “state vector of the universe”. The
present approach is based on the recognition that, like determinism, objective reality is
an unrealistic objective. It is shown how an objective theory of an essentially subjective
reality can be set up using an appropriately weighted probability measure on the relevant
set of Hilbert subspaces. It is suggested that an entropy principle (superseding the weak
anthropic principle) should be used to provide the weighting that is needed.
Text for exposition presented at Interdisciplinary Colloquium “La Philosophie de la
Nature aujourd’hui?”, Paris, March 2003, and 8th Peyresq Physics Meeting “The Early
Universe”, June 2003.
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Introduction
Among the diverse schools of thought concerning the interpretation of quantum theory,
it is the one founded by Everett [1] that can claim the widest nominal adherence [2] (if not
an absolute majority, surely more than for any specific alternative) within the theoretical
physics community. Those who are not satisfied by the Everett doctrine belong to two
distinct groups. The first (including perhaps a majority of experimental, as opposed to
theoretical, physicists) consists of those who have not thought about the issue, and who
are content with earlier Copenhagen type interpretations such as are useful in a restricted
laboratory context but inapplicable in a broader, e.g. cosmological, context. The others,
namely those who are not so content (and who have often been inclined to search – vainly
– for acceptable alternatives of a deterministic nature) are of two kinds, of which perhaps
the most numerous consists of those who dislike the prolificity implicit in Everett’s “many
world” idea. The remaining minority consists of those who have looked into the matter
sufficiently carefully to be aware of the intrinsic intellectual deficiency of the Everett
doctrine.
In order to satisfy the requirements of the latter group, namely those who are broad
minded about ontology, but more rigourously demanding in so far as intellectual coherence
is concerned, the alternative interpretation proposed here is based on a rather different
approach that incorporates ideas developed particularly by Dyson [3] and by Page [4].
Deficiency of the Everett interpretation
It has been recognised on many occasions that Everett’s doctrine is intrinsically self
contradictory if taken too literally, while on the other hand, if taken less literally, the
Everett “interpretation” is so ambiguous as to be essentially meaningless unless it is itself
provided with an appropriately coherent interpretation, of which various kinds [5] have
been envisaged
As in more traditional approaches, the starting point of the Everett doctrine is the
generally accepted principle that observational discrimination is describable in quantum
theory as a choice between mutually orthogonal Hilbert subspaces, which are describable as
the alternative branch-channels, each of which is characterised by a corresponding Hilbert
space projection operator e = e2.
It is to be noted that many writings, including those of Everett, convey the poten-
tially misleading idea that the number of such “branches” will automatically multiply as
successive observations are made. To see that, as emphasised by Tippler [6], this need
not – and indeed, beyond a certain point, ultimately cannot – be the case, it suffices to
consider the usual kind of toy sensor model, in which what is observed is a combination of
up or down spin orientations (with respect, for example, to a background magnetic field
direction) for a set of let us say S sensor particles. For a single particle initially in a pure
– let us say down – state, an elementary measurement will indeed double the number of
relevant branch channels, but such doubling can give rise to at most a maximum value
N = 2S of branch-channels, corresponding to the recording of a maximum of S bits of
information. Subsequent observations can record new information only at the expense of
erasure (by conversion [7] into Landauer entropy) of part of what was previously recorded
– unless of course the number S is itself increased. Extrapolating from the example of
such a toy to the case of a human observer, it is to be remarked that the relevant informa-
tion capacity S will indeed increase progressively during infancy (though not quite fast
enough to prevent children from forgetting as well as learning) but that it will saturate
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during adulthood (and ultimately decrease if a stage of senility is attained).
Whether their number is increasing or not, a set of probabilities for such alternative
branch-channels is supposed, in the traditional approach, to be provided by a prescription
whereby any particular branch channel, e say, will have probability
P[O]{e} = tr{Pe} , (1)
given by the appropriate choice of a von Neumann type (unit trace) operator, P, which
(as in the classical Bayesian case) is readjusted to take account of new observational infor-
mation as and when it becomes available. It is to be noted that this is just a conditional
probability, subject to the requirement that the relevant observation, Oe say, be actually
carried out. Further information must be supplied (as discussed below) if one needs an
absolute probability P{e} allowing for the unlikelihood of that particular observation ever
really being performed.
This works very well in a laboratory context for an observer outside the system under
consideration, but in more general (e.g. cosmological) contexts, involving more than one
observer inside the system, the desideratum of using a probability distribution that treats
distinct observers (having access to different information) on the same objective footing
poses a problem.
The Everett strategy for dealing with the problem of the subjectivity of observational
readjustment of the probability distribution is to deny any objective significance for ob-
servational discrimination by proclaiming [1] that all the relevant branch-channels are
“equally real”. The trouble with this is with this is that, if taken at its face value, it
disagrees with ordinary laboratory experience, for which the probability interpretation
works so well. In what Graham describes [8] as an attempt to to “escape from this
dilemma” Everett is obliged to resort to an Orwellian gambit whereby the meaning of of
“reality”, and of “equality”, is cast into doubt by the admission that the branch-channels
thus described are nevertheless characterised by different “weightings”. Although they
are supposed to be given in the usual way by a unit trace operator P, these “weightings”
are deemed not to be ordinary subjective probabilities but to have an objective physical
status inherited from a physically “real” state vector |Ψ〉 of the universe, in terms of which
the “weighting” operator has the pure state form P = |Ψ〉〈Ψ|.
Opinions may differ about the most appropriate choice of the cosmological state func-
tion [10, 11] and about whether the ontological prolificity entailed by the “many worlds”
idea is appealing or appaling [9], but what is intrinsicly wrong with Everett’s so called
“interpretation” is his failure to provide a self-consistent interpretation of the terms –
such as “weighting” and particularly “reality” – on which his formulation relies.
The approach described below provides a remedy in which the concept of “reality” is
interpreted in a more realistically restrictive manner, while the “weightings” are reinstated
in their traditional role as (conditional) probabilities in the usual (Born) sense.
A viable approach
Although other kinds of reality can be imagined (e.g. by theologians) the only reality
of which we have a direct knowledge is that of a subjective mental perception, which can
of course include memories of previous perceptions, which – as discussed by Page [4] – are
collectively construed as mind states of the perceptor. Many such mind states are inter-
pretable merely as dreams, but many more are interpretable as corresponding to events
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in an extrinsic physical world. The aim of the natural (physical and biological) sciences
is to understand how this physical world works and how our perceptions fit into it. These
sciences provide descriptions of various aspects of the extrinsic world in terms of more or
less elaborate theoretical models in which events that are actually supposed to occur are
selected within a wider class of eventualities that may or may not occur. (For example
a kind of toy model that is particularly popular for pedagogical and other purposes in
theoretical physics consists of a scalar field governed by a hyperbolic differential equation
whose solutions are the eventualities, of which a particular member is selected as an actual
event by some specific choice of initial conditions.)
It is sometimes useful to employ a model of the simplified kind (exemplified by that
of the traditional criminal jury, for which the only admissible eventualities are “guilty”
and “not guilty”) that is qualifiable as deterministic, meaning that the specification of
the events that actually occur is provided in an unambiguous manner. However it is
often more realistic to employ a model that is indeterminate, in the sense that it leaves
the question of which eventualities occur as actual events to be decided (or not, as the
case may be) by a process of observation and perception that may (subsequently) take
place outside the framework of the model under consideration. In the most effective kind
of indeterminate model, a guide to what is most likely to be (subsequently) observed is
provided by the attribution to the relevant eventualities of a probability weighting that
is conceived (there is a vast literature on this subject) as a generalisation of the relative
frequency that would be obtained if (as is seldom the case) it were possible perform an
unlimited number of observation and perception processes under identical conditions.
Among such probabilistic models, a particularly important category is that of quan-
tum theoretical models, which provide the most fundamental kind of physical description
available today. This means that other deterministic or probabilistic descriptions (such as
were sufficient for describing what was known before the end of the nineteenth century)
can be considered just as approximations to an underlying quantum description (which at
some future epoch may itself turn out to be qualifiable as an approximation to something
even more mysterious that has not yet been conceived, and for which there is as yet no
obvious necessity). In a quantum theory, an admissible eventuality, e say, is supposed to
be identifiable with a corresponding Hilbert subspace, for which a conditional probability
weighting is provided by a von Neumann type operator, P say, according to a prescription
of the form (1).
Since the various conceivable eventalities will in general not be mutually exclusive, the
sum of their conditional probabilities P[O]{e} can greatly exceed unity. A well behaved
probability measure P{e} on the set of Hilbert subspaces will however be obtainable
if a probability P{Oe} for the actual occurrence of a corresponding observational dis-
crimination (between e and a set of mutually orthognal alternatives that together form
an “observable” set completely spanning the Hilbert space of the system) is provided
within a suitably extended framework that includes an appropriate sensor system. The
probability P{e} for the eventuality e to be actually observed will then be given by
P{e} = P{Oe}P[O]{e} . (2)
Of course for most of the so called “observables” in physical models, such an actual
observation would be practically impossible or at best highly improbable, so that the
relevant factor P{Oe} would be negligibly small.
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In order to use an abstract physical model as a guide to “reality”, meaning [4] what is
actually perceived, it is of course necessary to postulate that there should be a correspon-
dence between the mind of the perceptor and the brain of a physical observer. It is to be
understood that the latter is identifiable within the model as a physical sensor subsystem,
for which there is a special subclass of eventualities – called perceptibles – of the particular
kind to which the the only events that are undisputably real – namely those identifiable
with actual perceptions – must belong.
In order to avoid attribution of a privileged status to some particular physical observer
such as Schroedinger (the performer of the famous cat experiment) or (like many a sub-
conscious solipsist) oneself, it is necessary to situate the probabilistic (quantum or even
classical) physical model within the framework of an extended perceptual system in which
the perceptor has the role of an ultimate sensor of sensors. The eventualities within this
perceptual system consist, not just of those within the underlying quantum mechanical
system, but in addition, for each perceptible eventuality e there is a corresponding per-
ceptual eventuality, Oe say, namely that of being being subject to an actual observational
discrimination by the perceptor. To complete the structure of the perceptual theory, all
that remains is to specify a corresponding distribution of probabilities P{Oe} (that must
vanish for non-perceptible eventualities) in a manner that avoids giving a priori privilege
to one’s own situation.
When this is done, the probability, P{e} say, for a particular perception to be the
one corresponding to the physical eventuality e will be given by an expression of the form
(2) in which P[O]{e} is the ordinary physical probability as given, according to (1) by
the underlying quantum mechanical model, while the factor P{Oe} is something that
must be provided by an ansatz that appropriately refines the original (weak) anthropic
principle [12, 13] whereby equal weight was attributed to comparable anthropic observers.
Entropic principle.
For the present purpose it is necessary not just to attribute a probability weighting
to the entire life of an observer qualifiable as anthropic (in the sense of being sufficiently
similar to ourselves) but to individual perceptions in the lives of observers who may be
very different. It is to be reiterated that these perceptions are not just simple events (like
the recognition that one’s cat is or is not still alive) but that they may involve an intricate
web of memories corresponding to something at least as complicated as what are known
as consistent histories [14].
A first idea that comes to mind is to take the required weighting P{Oe} for such a
perception to be proportional to its proper time duration, which in our human case is
generally considered [4] to be of the order of a fraction of a second. However the line of
reasonning developped in Dyson’s discussion [3] of other conceivable life forms suggests
that a more appropriate measure is that of the amount of information, Se, effectively
processed during the perception.
The relevant information value, Se say, may be roughly estimated as the informa-
tion capacity of the relevant number Ne of Everett type branch-channels (meaning the
maximum of the Shannon entropy obtained by summing −P log{P} for a probability
distribution P over the branch-channels) which will be given simply by
Se = log{Ne} , (3)
(using a logarithm with base 2 for ordinary bit units). If it is supposed that the relevant
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branch-channels all have the same dimension, which will be given by the rank of the
projection operator e associated with the perception, namely its trace tr{e}, then in a
Hilbert space with dimension tr{I} (where I is the identity operator) the required branch-
channel number will be given by
Ne = tr{I}/tr{e} . (4)
(It is to be noted that this ratio Ne is unaffected by the scaling up process that will occur
if the Hilbert space for a local system is extended to the higher dimensional Hilbert space
needed for describing a larger chunk of the universe. It is also to be noted that it is
multiplicative, so that the logarithm (3) will be additive, when perceptions by distinct
individuals are merged to form the perception of a team or of an entire civilisation. )
Dyson estimated that the total entropy Qe generated during a human perception would
be of the order of Avogadro’s number, but that includes metabolic processes throughout
the body, and so exceeds the Landauer entropy resulting [7] from the relevant mental
information Se by an enormous thermodynamic waste factor, We = Qe/Se ≫ 1.
The ansatz proposed here, namely
P{Oe} ∝ Se , (5)
with
Se = log{tr{I}} − log{tr{e}} , (6)
may appropriately be designated by the term entropic principle (paraphrasing the cruder
anthropic principle that it supersedes). It is to be hoped that future investigations (of a
neurological nature) may provide estimates of the absolute value of the relevant mental
information Se that are more precise than the vague indication provided here (namely that
in the adult human case it is very large compared with unity and very small compared
with Avogadro’s number) and that may be able to evaluate the decrease that presumably
occurs during a transition from a waking to a dreaming state. However the importance
of such uncertainties (and of the even greater uncertainty concerning the proportionality
factor in (5), which is affected by the weighting that may be attributed to conceivable
extraterrestrials) is diminished by the consideration that many applications require only
relative probabilities, not absolute probability values.
Substitution of (1) and (5) in (2) leads to a prescription giving the probability of a
perceptible eventuality e in the final form
P{e} ∝ Se tr{Pe} , (7)
with Se given by (6). The kind of approach encapsulated in this formula allows con-
siderable latitude for adaptation to satisfy idealogical desiderata of various alternative
kinds, such as belief that the von-Neumann operator P should be obtained from a pure
state function |Ψ〉 of the universe [10, 11], and prejudice for or against [9] ontological pro-
lificity. For example as formulated above, in terms of a single (though far from simple [4])
act of perception, the interpretation presented here may not entirely satisfy those who
demand that probabilities be defined in terms of frequencies. However that can easily
be remedied by supposing that a very large number of perceptions is made (by one or
many perceptors). So long as it does not affect the values of the distributions given by
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P{Oe} and P, such a multi-perceptual reinterpretation makes no difference for practical
(purely scientific) predictive purposes, though it might be slightly less satisfactory with
respect to Ockham’s “razor” criterion and much less satisfactory from the point of view
of ontological economy.
The author wishes to thank Martin Rees for hosting the meeting at which this proposal
was first informally mooted.
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